Concern for Truth (New Paper)
Published today in Symposion. abstract β Davidson was right when he said that the idea of truth as a goal or norm makes no sense β truth is not something we can aim for, and whenever we say that we aim for truth, what we are really aiming for is some kind of epistemic justification. Nevertheless, the notion of a concern for or with truth can be understood in (at least) three ways that do make sense: (1) it can refer to a philosophical concern with the nature of truth, theories of truth, and related philosophical problems; (2) it can...
Davidsonian Pragmatism
Donald Davidson didnβt like being called a pragmatist. He associated pragmatism with William Jamesβs definition of truth as that what works (or something similar), which he rejected for a number of reasons. Davidsonβs understanding of pragmatism and how it contrasts with his own view is probably most clearly expressed in a passage from βTruth Rehabilitatedβ: Truth is not a value, so the βpursuit of truthβ is an empty enterprise unless it means only that it is often worthwhile to increase our confidence in our beliefs, by collecting further evidence or checking our calculations. From the fact that we will never...